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Jean Ann Broderick was sexually assaulted and mur-
dered on November 17, 1991 in Minneapolis. There were 
no suspects, and the possibility of another unsolved crime 
loomed large. The police, however, discovered semen at 
the crime scene, extracted a DNA profile from this evidence, 
and entered the profile into the state DNA databank. The 
computer responded with what is known as a "cold hit" - a 
match that in an electronic second transformed a "no sus-
pect" case to one with overwhelming prosecutorial merit. It 
was the "first case in American history in which the new tool 
of DNA databanking was used to solve a rape or murder 
case." Levy, And the Blood Cried Out: A Prosecutor's 
Spellbinding Account of the Power of DNA 128 (1996). The 
prosecutor would later remark, "Without a DNA pool, there 
is no way we would have been able to identify the suspect. 
And we certainly would not have been able to get the con-
viction." ld. (quoting Steve Redding). 
Ohio has created a DNA databank. RC 109.573 estab-
lishes the database, and RC 2901.07 specifies which pris-
oners are subject to profiling - mostly sex and violent 
crime offenders. See 1 Katz & Giannelli, Baldwin's Ohio 
Practice Criminal Law 20.14 (1999 supp.). RC 2151.315 
governs juveniles. 
STATE STATUTES 
The first DNA databank used for criminal enforcement 
purposes was established by the Virginia legislature in 
1989. Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-310.2. Today, every state has 
enacted databanking legislation. See Hilbert, DNA 
Databanks: Law Enforcement's Greatest Surveillance 
Tool?, 34 Wake Forest L. Rev. 767, 775 (1999). The DNA 
Identification Act of 1994 provides federal funds to assist in 
this endeavor. Although each state legislates the conditions 
under which DNA samples are taken, the FBI has estab-
lished a national databank system, called CODIS 
(Combined DNA Index System), into which the state profiles 
can be entered. Now states can search the databases of 
other states. 
The state databank statutes vary widely with respect to 
their coverage. Some states require only sex offenders to 
provide samples for databank use. E.g., Colo. Rev. Stat.§ 
17-2 201 (5)(g)(sexual assault). Other states also include 
crimes of violence. E.g., Wash. Rev. Code§ 43.43.754; Mo. 
§ 650.055. Still others reach all convicted felons. E.g., Ala. 
Code § 36-18-24; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 29-16-6; Va. Code Ann. 
§ 19.2-31 0.2; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-19-403. One statute ex-
tends to persons arrested for a felony sex offense or other 
specified crimes. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15-609. Some states 
include juvenile offenders and others cover probationers as 
well as parolees. Several databanks also contain DNA pro-
files of missing persons and victims of mass disasters. The 
method of collection differs; some statutes require the col-
lection of blood (sometimes a finger prick) while others col-
lect cheek swabs. Some statutes contain expungement 
procedures, under which a person's profile may be removed 
from the database if that person's conviction is reversed on 
appeal. 
States also vary in the resources dedicated to DNA col-
lection and analysis. Some states have made considerable 
headway entering samples into their databases, while oth-
ers face a tremendous backlog of samples yet to be ana-
lyzed. One report notes: "So while a new national FBI 
databank and state databanks now hold a total of 270,000 
DNA profiles, there is also a backlog of roughly 500,000 un-
analyzed DNA specimens. And the DNA of an estimated 1 
million more people is supposed to be added by law, but 
some jurisdictions are already so far behind they're not 
even bothering to collect new samples." The Uncharted 
Future of DNA Detective Work, U.S. News & World Report, 
Oct. 25, 1999, at 33. 
While variations in the coverage and procedures for state 
databases produce inconsistencies, state databanks do 
share important similarities as well. First, DNA profiles are 
generally kept in a database that identifies them by a coded 
identification number. To determine the identity of the per-
son, a separate database must be accessed that decodes 
the• identification number and links the profile to a specific 
individual. These security measures help to ensure that the 
DNA profile does not provide readily useable information 
about the identity of a particular individual. Second, DNA 
databases generally contain one set of DNA profiles that 
have been taken from identified individuals, and a second 
set of profiles, usually taken from crime scenes, for which a 
match is sought. If a crime scene profile does not result in a 
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match, it remains in the system. Some time in the future it 
may be matched with the profile of a subsequently convict-
ed offender. Or, it may be matched with another crime 
scene profile, alerting the police that they are looking for a 
serial offender. 
PRIVACY AND RELATED CONCERNS 
The privacy issues associated with DNA profiling were 
recognized from the beginning. In 1990 Congress's Office 
of Technology Assessment highlighted this issue: "Citing 
the inherent intimacy of genetic information, the current and 
developing ability to test for personal information other than 
unique identity, and the difficulties of maintaining the confi-
dentially in a computer network, experts raise concerns that 
genetic information could be used unfairly to deny future 
benefits to persons with criminal records, and that genetic 
profiling within the criminal justice sphere could lead to 
wider testing and broader threats to privacy." Office of 
Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress. Genetic Witness: 
Forensic Uses of DNA Tests 35 (1990). 
The National Academy of Science's 1992 DNA report 
also took note of privacy concerns, citing developments in 
both molecular biology and computer technology. 
"Molecular geneticists are rapidly developing the ability to 
diagnose a wide variety of inherited traits and medical con-
ditions. The list already includes simply inherited traits, 
such as cystic fibrosis, Huntington's disease, and some in-
herited cancers. In the future, the list might grow to include 
more common medical conditions, such as heart disease, 
diabetes, hypertension, and Alzheimer's disease. Some ob-
servers even suggest that the list could include such traits 
as predispositions to alcoholism, learning disabilities, and 
other behavioral traits (although the degree of genetic influ-
ence on these traits remains uncertain)." National 
Research Council, DNA Technology in Forensic Science 
114 (1992). The report goes on to state: "Even simple in-
formation about identity requires confidentiality. Just as fin-
gerprint files can be misused, DNA profile identification in-
formation could be misused to search and correlate crimi-
nal-record databanks or medical record databanks. 
Computer storage of information increases the possibilities 
for misuse. For example, addresses, telephone numbers, 
social security numbers, credit ratings, range of incomes, 
demographic categories, and information on hobbies are 
currently available for many of the citizens in our society 
from various distributed computerized data sources." 
LEGAL CHALLENGES 
Databanks have been challenged on a wide range of 
constitutional grounds -for example, freedom of religion 
and the right to privacy. See Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302 
(4th Cir. 1992)(privacy); State v. Olivas, 856 P.2d 1076 
(Wash. 1993)(sam.e); Ryncarz v. Eikenberry, 824 F. Supp. 
1493, 1502 (E.D. Wash. 1993)(Statute "is generally applied 
to those within its purview and there is an absence of any 
evidence that would question its neutrality regarding the 
free exercise of religion. Both the statute and the accompa-
nying DNA policy are neutral towards imposing a burden on 
religion."). 
Six constitutional grounds are discussed in this article: 
self-incrimination, ex post facto, equal protection, due 
process, cruel and unusual punishment, and unreasonable 
search and seizure. In addition, states may provide greater 
protection under state constitutions or statutes than the U.S. 
Supreme Court has recognized under the federal constitu-
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tion; independent state grounds have been raised but no 
challenge has prevailed on this basis. See People v. 
Calahan, 649 N.E.2d 588, 592 (Ill. App. 1995)("[D]efendant 
has not met his burden of proving the statute unconstitution-
al under either the Federal or State constitution."); People v. 
Wealer, 636 N.E.2d 1129, 1137 (Ill. App. 1994)(111. Const. 
Art. I, § 6). 
SELF-INCRIMINATION CLAUSE 
Challenges to the collection of blood or saliva grounded 
in the Fifth Amendment have been quickly dismissed based 
on well-established precedent. The leading case is 
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). While being 
treated at a hospital for injuries sustained in an automobile 
collision, Schmerber was arrested for driving under the influ-
ence of alcohol. At the direction of the investigating police 
officer, a physician obtained a blood sample from 
Schmerber. Although the defendant objected to this proce-
dure on the advice of counsel, his blood was extracted and 
analyzed for alcoholic content. Before the Supreme Court, 
Schmerber argued that the extraction of blood violated the 
privilege against self-incrimination. Rejecting this argument, 
the Court held that the privilege covers only communicative 
or testimonial evidence, not physical or real evidence. 
According to the Court: 
It is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches 
an accused's communications, whatever form they 
might take.... On the other hand, both federal and 
state courts have usually held that it offers no protec-
tion against compulsion to submit to fingerprinting, 
photographing, or measurements, to write or speak for 
identification, to appear in court, to stand, to assume a 
stance, to walk, or to make a particular gesture. The 
distinction which has emerged, often expressed in dif-
ferent ways, is that the privilege is a bar against com-
pelling "communications" or "testimony," but that com-
pulsion which makes a suspect or accused the source 
of "real or physical evidence" does not violate it. ld. at 
763. 
Subsequent Supreme Court cases reaffirmed the testi-
monial-physical evidence distinction recognized in 
Schmerber. In United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 222 
(1967), the Court held that compelling an accused to exhibit 
his person for observation was compulsion "to exhibit his 
physical characteristics, not compulsion to disclose any 
knowledge he might have" and thus not proscribed by the 
privilege. In Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67 
(1967), the Court concluded that the compelled production 
of a "mere handwriting exemplar, in contrast to the content 
of what is written, like the voice or body itself, is an identify-
ing physical characteristic outside [the Fifth Amendment's] 
protection." 
Courts addressing the Fifth Amendment argument in the 
databank context have applied these precedents when re-
jecting such an argument. E.g., Shaffer v. Saffle, 148 F.3d 
1180, 1181 (10th Cir.)(Oklahoma statute)("We rejected the 
Fifth Amendment self-incrimination claim because the DNA 
samples are not testimonial in nature."), cert. denied, 119 
S.Ct. 520 (1998); Boling v. Romer, 101 F.3d 1336, 1340 
(1Oth Cir. 1996)(Colorado statute) ("Plaintiff's Fifth 
Amendment claim, alleging that requiring DNA samples 
from inmates amounts to compulsory self-incrimination, fails 
because DNA samples are not testimonial in nature."); 
Cooper v. Gammon, 943 S.W.2d 699, 705 (Mo. App. 
1997)(same). 
EX POST FACTO CLAUSE 
The United States Constitution prohibits the retroactive 
application of criminal laws. Article I provides that neither 
Congress nor any State shall pass an "ex post facto Law." 
U.S. Canst. Art. I,§ 9, cl. 3; U.S. Canst. Art. I,§ 10. 
According to the Supreme Court, this prohibition means that 
"[l]egislatures may not retroactively alter the definition of 
crimes or increase the punishment of criminal acts." Collins 
v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 42 (1990). 
Non-Penal Purpose 
Some courts have ruled that the ex post facto prohibition 
does not apply because databanking statutes are not penal 
in nature. For example, the Ninth Cir~uit rejected such a 
challenge to the Oregon statute because its "obvious pur-
pose is to create a DNA data bank to assist in the identifica-
tion, arrest, and prosecution of criminals, not to punish con-
victed murderers and sexual offenders." Rise v. Oregon, 59 
F.3d 1556, 1562 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1190 
(1996). Accord Shaffer v. Saffle, 148 F. 3d 1180, 1182 (1Oth 
Cir. 1998) ("other circuits have upheld similar statutes 
against the same challenge"; because the "statutes have a 
legitimate, non penal legislative purpose, they do not run 
afoul of the Ex Post Facto Clause under these circum-
stances."), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 520 (1 998). 
The ex post facto issue, however, does not necessarily 
disappear merely by labeling a statute as "non-penal." Ex 
post facto principles apply when punishment is retroactively 
increased, and that may occur if a sanction for refusal to 
provide a DNA sample is the denial of parole or the forfei-
ture of good time credits (credits awarded for a period of 
good behavior in prison). See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. Dall. 
386, 390 (1798) ("Every law that changes the punishment, 
and inflicts greater punishment, than the law annexed to the 
crime, when committed."). Much depends on how a parole 
or good time statute is written. 
Parole 
If parole is purely discretionary, a parole board may con-
sider a refusal to comply with a valid prison regulation, 
such as one requiring a DNA sample, in determining the ap-
propriateness of parole. In contrast, an increase in the 
length of a sentence caused by new conditions in a manda-
tory parole jurisdiction is suspect. For example, the Virginia 
parole statute mandated parole six months before the sen-
tence release date, and the Fourth Circuit ruled that with-
holding release for failure to provide DNA samples would be 
unconstitutional. Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 31 0 (4th 
Cir. 1992)("[T]he continued incarceration beyond a time six 
months prior to the end of the actual sentence of an inmate 
convicted prior to the enactment of [the statute] for any rea-
son not reflected in the terms of the mandatory parole provi-
sion, would constitute a retroactive extension of the in-
mate's sentence which is prohibited by the Ex Post Facto 
Clause."). 
Good-Time Credit 
Reduction of good-time credit raises somewhat different 
issues. In Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 32 (1981), the 
Supreme Court ruled that the elimination of good time-credit 
constituted an increase in punishment because "a prison-
er's eligibility for reduced imprisonment is a significant factor 
entering into both the defendant's decision to plea bargain 
and the judge's calculation of the sentence to be imposed." 
Weaver, however, involved inmates whose good-time 
credit was legislatively reduced across the board, even if 
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they had not violated any prison regulation. Several courts 
have distinguished databank statutes on this basis, finding 
that at the time of sentencing good-time credits were known 
to be contingent on compliance with legitimate prison regu-
lations and the nature of those regulations may be amend-
ed while the prisoner is serving penitentiary time. See 
Gilbert v. Peters, 55 F.3d 237, 239 (7th Cir. 1995) 
("Disciplinary measures imposed on inmates for failing to 
obey orders ... do not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause."); 
Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 309-10 (4th Cir. 1992) ("The 
Ex Post Facto Clause does not prevent prison administra-
tors from adopting and enforcing reasonable regulations 
that are consistent with good prison administration, safety 
and efficiency. .. . It is precisely because reasonable prison 
regulations, and subsequent punishment for infractions 
thereof, are contemplated as part of the sentence of every 
prisoner, that they do not constitute an additional punish-
ment and are not classified as ex post facto. Moreover, 
since a prisoner's original sentence does not embrace a 
right to one set of regulations over another, reasonable 
amendments, too, fall within the anticipated sentence of 
every inmate."). 
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE 
The Fourteenth Amendment establishes that no state 
may "deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws." Several inmates have asserted equal 
protection grounds as a basis for striking down databank 
statutes. They claim, for example, that sex offenders are 
treated differently from other offenders in violation of the 
equal protection mandate. 
These challenges have been rejected under what is 
known as the "rational basis" test, which is derived from a 
long line of Supreme Court decisions. Under this type of ju-
dicial review, a "statute is presumed to be valid and will be 
sustained if the classification is rationally related to a legiti-
mate state interest." Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 
486 U.S. 71, 81 (1988). 
In Boling v. Romer, 101 F.3d 1336, 1341 (10th Cir. 1996) 
(Colorado statute), the Tenth Circuit rejected the argument 
that taking DNA samples only from sex offenders violated 
the Equal Protection Clause. The court held that there was 
a "rational relationship" between the "government's decision 
to classify inmates as convicted sex offenders and the gov-
ernment's stated objective to investigate and prosecute un-
solved and future sex crimes." See also Roe v. Marcottte 
193 F. 3d 72, 82 (2d Cir. 1 999) ("The district court correctly 
found that the statute survives a rational basis analysis. 
Plaintiffs presented no evidence that there was a compelling 
need to test other violent felons."). 
DUE PROCESS 
Both the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments forbid the 
denial of life, liberty, or property "without due process of 
law." Inmates have asserted two different due process ar-
guments: substantive due process and procedural due 
process. 
Substantive Due Process 
The Supreme Court has stated that "[d]ue process of law 
is a summarized constitutional guarantee of respect for 
those personal immunities which ... are 'so rooted in the 
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as 
fundamental' .. ·. or are 'implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty."' Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165,169 (1951). 
In Rocfiin the Supreme Court held that the forcible stom-
ach pumping of a suspect to recover narcotic pills 
"shock[ed] the conscience" and did not comport with tradi-
tional ideas of fair play and decency, thereby violating due 
process. By contrast, the Supreme Court, faced with a due 
process challenge in Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 
(1957), upheld the involuntary extraction of blood from a 
suspect while he was unconscious after an automobile acci-
dent in order to determine whether he was intoxicated. In 
distinguishing Rochin, the Court emphasized that unlike the 
extraction of stomach contents, the extraction of blood was 
performed "under the protective eye of a physician" and was 
a routine and scientifically accurate method that did not in-
volve the "brutality" and "offensiveness" present in Rochin. 
ld. at 435-37 ("a blood test taken by a skilled technician is 
not such 'conduct that shocks the conscience' ... nor such 
a method of obtaining evidence that it offends a 'sense of 
justice."'). 
Procedural Due Process 
Procedural due process mandates that a person cannot 
be deprived of "life, liberty, or property" without a hearing 
and certain procedural safeguards, although the nature of 
the safeguards differs depending on the interest involved. 
Some inmates have challenged DNA databank statutes on 
the grounds that the taking of a DNA sample without a hear-
ing deprives them of a liberty or property interest in their ge-
netic material without due process of law. These challenges 
have uniformly failed. 
In Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556, 1562-63 (9th Cir. 1994), 
the plaintiffs argued that the Due Process Clause required 
prison officials to provide an opportunity for a hearing before 
requiring felons to submit a blood sample in accordance 
with bre~iori's databank statute. The court held that "[t]he 
extraction of blood from an individual in a simple, medically 
acceptable manner, despite the individual's lack of an op-
portunity to object to the procedure, does not implicate the 
Due Process Clause." Accord Cooper v. Gammon, 943 
S.W.2d 699, 706 (Mo. App. 1997). 
Similarly, in Boling v. Romer, 1 01 F. 3d 1336, 1340 (1Oth 
Cir. 1997), the plaintiff challenged a Colorado statute that 
required inmates convicted of sexual assault offenses to 
submit a DNA sample as a condition of release on parole. 
Without providing the sample, an inmate could not regain 
his liberty. The court nevertheless found that plaintiff's argu-
ment that the state "unconstitutionally deprived him of a 
property interest in his blood without due process" was "un-
persuasive." The court explained that parole in Colorado 
was discretionary and that convicted individuals have no 
constitutional right to be conditionally released before the 
expiration of their valid sentences. 
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 
Several challenges to DNA databanks have been by pris-
oners who focused on the Eighth Amendment, which pro-
scribes cruel and unusual punishment. In Sanqers v. 
Coman, 864 F.Supp. 496, 498 (E.D. N.C. 1994)(North 
Carolina), inmates argued that the use of force to obtain 
blood samples violated the Amendment; they alleged: "The 
uses of force have included instances of several officers 
surrounding an inmate while one held his arm still, the 
spraying of mace, and bending inmates' wrists in a painful 
manner to induce compliance." An Eighth Amendment vio-
lation, however, occurs only if force is applied for the pur-
pose of causing harm, Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 
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(1992}, or if the force is excessive. Whitley v. Albers, 475 
U.S. 312, 319 (1986)("[T]he infliction of pain in the course of 
a prison security measure ... does not amount to cruel and 
unusual punishment simply because it may appear in retro-
spect that the degree of force ... was unreasonable, and 1 ~~ 
hence unnecessary in the strict sense."). 
Neither theory applied in this context. Here, force was 
used to compel compliance with a valid prison regulation. 
Courts have also held that placement in solitary confine-
ment for failing to comply with an order to provide a blood 
sample does not violate the Clause. See Cooper v. Gam-
mon, 943 S.W.2d 699, 707 (Mo. App. 1997)("A refusal to 
obey a lawful order undermines the authority of prison offi-
cials and affects the security and good order of the facility."). 
See also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472,485 (1995) 
("Discipline by prison officials in response to a wide range of 
misconduct falls within the expected parameters of the sen-
tence imposed by a court of law."). 
SEARCH AND SEIZURE 
The most significant legal challenge to databanks is 
based on the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreason-
able searches and seizures. Although the U.S. Supreme 
Court has yet to address the issue, its decisions in other 
areas provide a framework for analysis. 
The Fourth Amendment is intended to ensure "privacy, 
dignity, and security of persons against certain arbitrary and 
invasive acts by officers of the Government or those acting 
at their direction." Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' 
Association, 489 U.S. 602, 613-14 (1989). There are three 
distinct Fourth Amendment issues raised in this context. 
First, there is a "seizure" of the person, which brings that 
person under the control of government officials. Second, ( 
there is the subsequent search and seizure of a biological 
sample or trace evidence from this person. Third, the use 
to which the genetic information in the sample is put raises 
a final Fourth Amendment issue. 
A finding that the Fourth Amendment applies does not 
mean that a procedure is unconstitutional. That is merely 
the first step in the analysis. As the Supreme Court has 
often remarked: "[T]he Fourth Amendment does not pro-
scribe all searches and seizures, but only those that are un-
reasonable." Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619 
Applicability of the 4th Amendment 
Seizure of the Person. In the databanking context the 
first issue - seizure of the person - is not problematic be-
cause convicts are already incarcerated. The seizure would 
be an issue for parolees, probationers, or previously re-
leased convicts. Nevertheless, notifying such persons to re-
port and provide DNA samples would be a reasonable 
seizure. 
Search to Obtain Samples. The leading case on defining 
which governmental activities are "searches" within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment is Katz v. United States, 
389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). Katz substituted a privacy ap-
proach for the traditional property approach to this issue. 
According to the Supreme Court: "[T]he Fourth Amendment 
protects people, not places. What a person knowingly ex-
poses to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a 
subject of Fourth Amendment protection. . . . But what he . "· 
seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to 
the public, may be constitutionally protected." 
There is little dispute that taking blood samples is a 
search. In Schmerberthe Supreme Court held that the ex-
traction of blood for the purpose of scientific analysis "plain-
ly constitutes searches of the 'persons"' within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment. In Skinner, which involved a 
drug testing program, the Court wrote that "it is obvious that 
this physical intrusion, penetrating beneath the skin, in-
fringes ail expectation of privacy that society is prepared to 
recognize as reasonable." In addition to blood samples, 
lower courts have generally treated the taking hair, Bouse v. 
Bussey, 573 F.2d 548, 550 (9th Cir. 1 977); United States v. 
D'Amico, 408 F.2d 331, 333 (2d Cir. 1 969), and saliva sam-
ples as searches. United States v. Nicolosi, 885 F. Supp. 
50, 55 (E.D. N.Y. 1995). 
In contrast, the taking of fingerprints, voice exemplars, or 
handwriting samples are not searches. Cupp v. Murphy, 412 
U.S. 291, 294 (1 973); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 
1,14 (1 973); United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 21 (1 973). 
Use of Genetic Information. In Skinner the Supreme 
Court also ruled that the subsequent chemical analysis of a 
blood sample to obtain physiological data "is a further inva-
sion" of privacy interests - informational privacy. This point 
was further refined when the Court considered the collection 
of urine samples. Even though this procedure did not in-
volve a bodily intrusion, the Court held that it was a search. 
Like blood, the chemical analysis of urine can "reveal a host 
of private medical facts," including whether a person is 
epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic. See also People v. Wealer, 
636 N.E.2d 1129, 1132 (Ill. App. 1994) ("conducting addi-
tional analysis on the sample further implicates fourth 
amendment interests.") 
The courts addressing the constitutionality of databank 
statutes have acknowledged the applicability of the Fourth 
Amendment to the taking of a sample as well as its subse-
quent analysis. E.g., Schlicher v. (NFN) Peters, I & II, 103 
F. 3d 940, 942 (1Oth Cir. 1996)("1t is agreed that the collec-
tion, analysis and storage of blood and saliva as authorized 
by [the Kansas statute] is a search and seizure within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.")(citing Skinner and 
Schmerber'); Landry v. Attorney General, 709 N.E.2d 1085, 
1 090 (Mass. 1999)(''There is no disagreement that th~ invol-
untary collection of a blood sample from a person designat-
ed to furnish one under the Act constitutes a 'search and 
seizure' for purposes of the Fourth Amendment and art. 14 
[of the state constitution]."); People v. Wealer, 636 N.E.2d 
1129, 1132 (Ill. App. 1994)("Nor do the parties dispute that 
the taking of saliva samples implicates fourth Amendment 
concerns, although it seems that the level of intrusion nec-
essary to obtain a salvia sample would on its face appear 
lower than the required for extracting blood."); State v. 
Olivas, 856 P.2d 1076, 1081 (Wash. 1993)(''The State ac-
knowledges that nonconsensual blood extraction consti-
tutes a search."). 
Consequently, the databanking litigation has focused on 
the second step in Fourth Amendment analysis -the rea-
sonableness of these programs. 
Reasonableness of Search 
As noted above, the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit 
all searches, only unreasonable ones. Traditionally, reaso_n-
able searches are those conducted pursuant to a warrant IS-
sued by a neutral and detached magistrate and based on 
probable cause. Moreover, search warrants must describe 
the place to be searched and the items to be seized with 
"particularity." The particularity requirement circumscribes 
the police's discretion in executing a search warrant. 
Nevertheless, exceptions to these traditional requirements 
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have been recognized, and courts have cited several in up-
holding DNA databank statutes. 
The databank cases can be grouped around three lines 
of precedents: (1) administrative searches, (2) "special 
needs" searches, and (3) prisoner searches. These cate-
gories, however, are not mutually exclusive- and they all 
involve a balancing of interests in determining the reason-
ableness of the procedure. The next sections focus on sex-
offenders, the most common category in the DNA data-
. banks. Later sections discuss persons convicted of other 
crimes and arrestees. 
Administrative Search Model 
Originally, the phrase administrative search was used to 
describe non-law enforcement searches. For example, the 
landmark case, Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 
538 (1967), involved housing inspections. The purpose of 
these inspections was not to gather evidence of criminal 
conduct but rather to ensure compliance with health and 
safety standards. Housing inspectors rather than police offi-
cers conducted these searches. Violation of the regula-
tions, however, could result in criminal prosecution. 
In Camara, the Court held that the reasonableness of an 
administrative search is determined by balancing the gov-
ernmental interest against the nature and extent of the intru-
sion on privacy. 
The ... argument is in effect an assertion that the area 
inspection is an unreasonable search. Unfortunately, 
there can be no ready test for determining reasonable-
ness other than by balancing the need to search 
against the invasion which the search entails. But we 
think that a number of persuasive factors combine to 
support the reasonableness of area code-enforcement 
inspections. First, such programs have a long history 
of judicial and public acceptance. Second, the public 
interest demands that all dangerous conditions be pre-
vented or abated, yet it is doubtful that any other can-
vassing technique would achieve acceptable results. 
Many such conditions- faulty wiring is an obvious ex-
ample - are not observable from outside the building 
arid indeed may not be apparent to the inexpert occu-
pant himself. Finally, because inspections are neither 
personal in nature nor aimed at the discovery of evi-
dence of crime, they involve a relatively limited inva-
sion of the urban citizen's privacy. ld. at 536-37 (cita-
tions omitted). 
The Court found the inspection system '"of indispensable 
importance to the maintenance of community health."' 
Thus, in Camara, the Court concluded that housing inspec-
tion programs were supported by the compelling govern-
ment interest of avoiding dangerous living conditions and 
maintaining housing stock and that the inspection programs 
were a reasonable means for enforcing these societal inter-
ests. 
Later cases involved the inspection of liquor stores, gun 
dealers, mines, and the workplace pursuant to the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act. See United States v. 
Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 
594 (1981); Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978). 
Perhaps, the most familiar administrative search is the 
metal detector procedures at airports. 
New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987), is a transitional 
case in this context. It involved a New York statute authoriz-
ing warrantless administrative searches of automobile junk-
yards, which the Supreme Court upheld. The key point is 
that:the,staJIJtewas aimed specifically at finding evidence of 
c;irne. In contrast, prior administrative searches had fo-
cused on governmental interests such as health and safety. 
Moreover, the junkyard inspections were conducted by the 
police. In a later case, the Court employed the balancing 
test to uphold sobriety roadblock-checkpoints. Michigan 
Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990). 
While the balancing approach provides flexibility in 
achieving significant government objectives, such as airline 
passenger safety, the danger exists that this approach will 
result in the "balancing" away of constitutional rights. 
Therefore, this approach demands rigor. For example, 
while the Supreme Court has upheld drug testing of railroad 
employees after an accident and custom's officers involved 
in drug interdiction operations, it has struck down the drug 
testing of political candidates as mandated by a Georgia 
statute. Miller v. Chandler, 502 U.S. 305 (1997). The Court 
simply found that the justification for this procedure lack 
compelling reasons. 
Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 1999), can be used 
to illustrate this approach. In this case, the Second Circuit 
reviewed the Connecticut databank statute, which is limited 
to sex offenders. First, the court correctly found the govern-
ment interest - solving past and future violent sex crimes 
- both legitimate and significant. See People v. Wealer, 
636 N.E.2d 1129, 1136 (Ill. App. 1994) ("Its interest is espe-
cially compelling when we consider that sex offenders fre-
quently target children as their victims."). Moreover, the 
databank system "may" deter future crimes by those whose 
profile are in the system. 
Second, the means selected to accomplish these objec-
tives were reasonable. The state cited studies showing a 
highrC!te of recidivism for sexual offenders. Moreover, DNA 
evidence is "particularly useful" in investigating these crimes 
"because of the nature of the evidence left at the scenes of 
these crimes and the demonstrated reliability of DNA test-
ing." 
Third, the blanket testing of all sex offenders eliminated 
the need for discretionary decisions, an historical concern in 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. See Shelton v. 
Gudmanson, 934 F. Supp. 1048, 1051 (W.O. Wis. 1996) 
("the sampling was carried out pursuant to state regulations 
that required the testing of every inmate falling with a cer-
tain category, thus ensuring that arbitrary testing decisions 
would not be made."). 
Fourth, the intrusion -the extraction of blood - is slight 
("minimal" in the Supreme Court's view) and does not raise 
a health risk. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 625 (blood tests do 
not "infringe significant privacy interests"); Winston v. Lee, 
470 U.S. 753, 762 (1985) ("recognized society's judgment 
that blood tests do not constitute an unduly extensive impo-
sitiorfon a individual's personal privacy and bodily integri-
ty."). In these circumstances, the Second Circuit held that 
the balance tipped in favor of the databanking statute. 
Three other aspects of the Connecticut scheme are note-
worthy. First, trained medical personnel are required to take 
the blood sample. See also People v. Wealer, 636 N.E.2d 
1129, 1136 (Ill. App. 1994)("[T]he collection of samples must 
be performed in a medically approved manner, and only 
certain qualified medical personnel are permitted to with-
draw blood."). Second, the identifying information associat-
ed with the DNA profile remains anonymous until a match is 
made. Third, procedures limiting access to and dissemina-
tion of information in the system are specified. See also 
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People v; Wealer, 636 N.E.2d 1129, 1136 (Ill. App. 
1994 )("[T]he information is kept strictly confidential and is 
made available only to law enforcement officials."). 
"Special Needs" Search Model 
Over time, the Supreme Court extended the rationale un- 41 
derlying administrative searches to other areas, commonly 
called "special needs" searches. For example, the Court in 
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985), applied this ra-
tionale to searches of public school children by teachers; 
the "special need" was the maintenance of a safe, orderly, 
and contraband-free school environment in order to create a 
healthy learning atmosphere. To achieve the desired envi-
ronment, the Court recognized that "the school setting re-
quires some easing of the restrictions to which searches by 
public authorities are ordinarily subject." ld. at 340. See 
also O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987)(employing 
"special needs" concept to the search of a government em-
ployee's work spEJ.ce for evidence of work-related viola-
tions). 
Similarly, in Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987), the 
Supreme Court upheld a Wisconsin regulation that permit-
ted a warrantless search of a probationer's home if there 
existed "reasonable grounds" to believe that the probationer 
possessed contraband. The Court observed that "[a] 
State's operation of a probation system, like its operation of 
a school, government office or prison, or its supervision of a 
regulated industry, likewise presents 'special needs' beyond 
normal law enforcement that may justify departures from the 
usual warrant and probable-cause requirements" and that 
"in certain circumstances government investigators conduct-
ing searches pursuant to a regulatory scheme need not ad-
here to the usual warrant or probable-cause requirements ~•"1 
as long as their searches meet 'reasonable legislative or ad- ·. • 
ministrative standards."' ld. at 873-74 (quoting Camara at 
538). 
Subsequently, the Court applied this rationale in cases 
involving government-required alcohol and drug testing for 
railroad employees and customs agents involved in drug in-
terdiction. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Assn, 
489 U.S. 602, 620-21 (1989)(railway safety)(Federal 
Railway Administration "has prescribed toxicological tests, 
not to assist in the prosecution of employees, but rather 'to 
prevent accidents and casualties in railroad operations that 
result from impairment of employees by alcohol or drugs"); 
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 
656, 665-66 (1989)("[W]here a Fourth Amendment intrusion 
serves special governmental needs, beyond the normal 
need for law enforcement, it is necessary to balance the in-
dividual's privacy expectations against the Government's in-
terests to determine whether it is impractical to require a 
warrant or some level of individualized suspicion in the par-
ticular context."). See also Vernonia School District v. 
Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (approving suspicionless drug 
testing of student athletes). 
In the school and probationer cases, the special need re-
sulted in a lesser standard (reasonable suspicion instead of 
probable cause) of justification for an invasion of privacy, 
while the drug testing cases upheld regulatory schemes that 
did not require any quantum of proof. 
A number of courts have used the "special needs" ratio- '· 
nale to uphold databank statutes. See Shelton v. 
Gudmanson, 934 F. Supp. 1048, 1051 (W.O. Wisconsin 
1996)("Aithough the state's DNA testing of inmates is ulti-
mately for a law enforcement goal, it seems to fit within the 
special needs analysis the Court has developed for drug 
testing and searches of probationers' homes, since it is not 
undertaken for the investigation of a specific crime."); State 
v. Olivas, 856 P.2d 1076, 1086 (Wash. 1993) (rejecting a 
Fourth Amendment challenge to a DNA identification based 
on "special needs" analysis of Skinner). 
In contrast, other courts have balked at applying the 
"special needs" rationale in this context, noting that this cat-
egory is limited to governmental objectives ''beyond normal 
law enforcement." See People v. Wealer, 636 N.E.2d 1129, 
1135 (Ill. App. 1994)("[W]e are reluctant to extend the spe-
cial needs line of cases to the present statute, which has an 
ostensible law enforcement purpose."); State v. Olivas, 856 
P.2d 1076, 1092 (Wash. 1993)(concurring opinion)("The 
choice of balancing tests, however, is critical. Because 
'special needs' is not limited to minimally intrusive searches 
or seizures, an extension of the analysis into the area of 
criminal law enforcement could ultimately render the war-
rant requirement itself illusory."). 
Other courts point out, however, that special needs 
searches, such as probationer searches, are also associat-
ed with law enforcement but do not involve the investigation 
of a specific crime. Shelton v. Gudmanson, 934 F. Supp. 
1048, 1050-51 (W.O. Wis. 1996)(Wisconsin statute) ("In 
Griffin, for example, the Court noted that the warrantless 
search of the probationer's home had been carried out pur-
suant to valid regulation promulgated by the· state. Although 
the state's DNA testing of inmates is ultimately for a law en-
forcement goal, it seems to fit within the special needs 
analysis the Court had developed for drug testing and 
search of probationers' homes, since it is not undertaken for 
the investigation of a specific crime.")( citation omitted). 
More importantly, as noted above, the administrative 
search and "special needs" categories are not mutually ex-
clusive - indeed, they often overlap. This is because the 
"special need" beyond traditional law enforcement is typical-
ly some administrative objective. For example, an inventory 
search of the personal belongings of arrestees prior to in-
carceration in a jail cell is reasonable, whether classified as 
a "special need" or an administrative search. Similarly, this 
procedure could also be considered a prison search, the 
next category to be considered. The important point is the 
"balancing" rationale employed in determining reasonable-
ness. There may, however, be a tendency in some opinions 
to use the "special needs" as a talismanic incantation, cur-
tailing further inquiry. 
Fourth Amendment Rights of Prisoners 
In Jones v. Murray, 62 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1992), the 
Fourth Circuit adopted a third type of analysis. In upholding 
the Virginia statute, the Fourth Circuit relied on several 
Supreme Court decisions that had held that prisoners had 
reduced expectations of privacy under the Fourth 
Amendment. See also Shaffer v. Saffle, 148 F.3d 1180, 
1181 (1Oth Cir. 1998)(0klahoma statute)("[W]hile obtaining 
DNA samples implicates Fourth Amendment concerns, it is 
reasonable in light of an inmate's diminished privacy rights, 
the minimal intrusion involved, and the legitimate govern-
ment interest in using DNA to investigate and prosecute 
crimes."); Schlicher v. (NPN) Peters, I & I, 103 F.3d 940 
(1Oth Cir. 1996)(Kansas statute)(same); Boling v. Romer, 
101 F.3d 1336, 1340 (1Oth Cir. 1996) ("[W]hile obtaining and 
analyzing the DNA or saliva of an inmate convicted of a sex 
offense is a search and seizure implicating Fourth 
Amendment concerns, it is a reasonable search and 
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seizure. This is so in light of an inmate's diminished privacy 
rights; the minimal intrusion of saliva and blood tests; and 
the legitimate government interest in the investigation and 
prosecution of unsolved and future criminal acts by the use 
of DNA in a manner not significantly different from the use 
of fingerprints."); Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556, 1562 (9th 
Cir. 1995)('Taking into account all of the factors discussed 
above- the reduced expectations of privacy held by per-
sons convicted of one of the felonies to which [the statute) 
applies, the blood extractions' relatively minimal intrusion 
into these persons's privacy interests, the public's incon-
testable interest in preventing recidivism and identifying and 
prosecuting murderers and sexual offenders, and the likeli-
hood that a DNA data bank will advance this interest - we 
conclude that [the statute) is reasonable and therefore con-
stitutional under the Fourth .A.mendment."), cert. denied, 517 
U.S. 1161 (1996); In re Maricopa County Juvenile Action, 
930 P.2d 496 (Ariz. App. 1996) Uuvenile sex offenders); 
Landry v. Attorney General, 709 N.E.2d 1085, 1092 (Mass. 
1999); Cooper v. Gammon, 943 S.W.2d 699, 705 (Mo. App. 
1997)("Because of the reduced expectation of privacy held 
by prisoners .... "). 
The first Supreme Court decision is Bell v. Wolfish, 441 
U.S. 520, 558-60 (1979), in which the Court upheld the con-
stitutionality of body cavity inspections of pretrial inmates 
following "contact visits," even in the absence of probable 
cause. The Court's rationale in determining the reasonable-
ness of the procedure focused on the security dangers in-
herent in this environment: "A detention facility is a unique 
place fraught with serious security dangers. Smuggling of 
money, drugs, weapons, and other contraband is all too 
common an occurrence. And inmate attempts to secrete 
these items into the facility by concealing them in body 
cavities are documented in this record." 
In a later case, Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984), 
the Supreme Court upheld cell searches ("shakedown" in-
spections) for the purpose of discovering contraband in a 
prison. The Court, in a 5-4 decision, ruled that a prisoner 
did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a cell. 
Yet, this holding (like Wolfish) was justified on institutional 
security needs. The Court wrote: 'The recognition of priva-
cy rights for prisoners in their individual cells simply cannot 
be reconciled with the concept of incarceration and the 
needs and objectives of penal institutions." ld. at 526. 
There are no institutional security needs in the databank-
ing context, and thus this rationale is simply inapplicable. 
Indeed, some statutes apply even in the absence of incar-
ceration. See People v. Wealer, 636 N.E.2d 1129, 1135 (Ill. 
App. 1994)("[P]ractical considerations of prison administra-
tion, as an underlying justification, cannot be reconciled with 
the express language of [the statute) which mandates taking 
samples regardless of whether the convicted sex offender is 
ultimately incarcerated."). Moreover, both Wolfish and 
Hudson acknowledged that the Court's jurisprudence in 
prisoner cases recognizes the applicability of constitutional 
protections: "There is no iron curtain drawn between the 
Constitution and the prisons of this country." Wolff v. 
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974). See also 
Giannelli & Gilligan, Prison Searches and Seizures: 
"Locking" the Fourth Amendment Out of Correctional 
Facilities, 62 Va. L. Rev. 1045 (1976). 
Expansion of Coverage Beyond Sex Offenders 
Most databank statutes are limited to sex-offenders. 
These provisions are supported by empirical research on 
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recidivism, a fact noted by several courts in upholding data-
baf:lls~statutes:-See Sheltonv. Gudmanson, 934 F. Supp. 
1048, 1051 (W.D. Wis. 1996)(The state "has confined the 
collec;ting of such data to those offenders [sex offenses] that 
have been shown to have a relatively high likelihood of re-
cidivism."). The nature of these offenses- their brutality 
and their often serial nature- is a critical point, because in 
one sense all law enforcement is a legitimate governmental 
objective. However, some statutes also encompass homi-
cides and crimes of violence. Still others include all felons. 
The justification for including prisoners who have been con-
victed of white-collar felonies is difficult to discern. Even the 
sex offender category is problematic if it includes prostitu-
tion and public indecency as some statutes do. 
Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1992), the Fourth 
Circuit case cited above, addressed this issue because all 
felons are included in the Virginia system. To buttress its 
position, the court cited recidivism studies encompassing all 
felons. The inmates, however, argued that the statistics on 
nonviolent felons undercut the state's position. The in-
mates' "statistics indicate[ d) that 97% of the cases in which 
DNA evidence was used to link a defendant with a crime in-
volved murder or rape, and further, less than 1% of all non-
violent offenders are later arrested on murder and rape 
charges." ld. at 308. In response, the Jones majority merely 
noted that the percentages need not be high where the ob-
jective is significant and the privacy intrusion is limited; the 
court cited Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 
444 (1990) (upholding roadblock to detect drunk drivers de-
spite resulting arrest rate of 1.5%). 
The dissent in Jones believed that the distinction be-
tween violent and nonviolent felons was determinative: 
''The only state interest offered by the Commonwealth for in-
cluding non-violent felons is administrative ease" but such 
an interest does not suffice "to outweigh a prisoner's expec-
tation of privacy in not having blood withdrawn from his 
body when that prisoner is not significantly more likely to 
commit a violent crime in the future than a member of the 
general population." ld. at 313-14. Indeed, the state senate 
report concluded that recidivism data only "supported the in-
clusion of plaintiffs convicted for felony sex offenses, as-
sault, capital murder, first and second degree murder, volun-
tary manslaughter, larceny and burglary." ld. at 314. All 
felons were added to make the databank "more efficient and 
cost effective." The dissent also pointed to other statistics in 
the record: "United States Justice Department statistics 
provided in the record show that only %0.4 of"non-violent 
felons are later arrested on rape charges, and only %0.8 
are later arrested on murder charges. One might assume 
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non-violent drug offenders would be more likely to commit 
violent crime subsequent to release than other non-violent 
felons; yet, only %0.4 of them are later arrested for rape, 
and %0.3 for murder." The dissenting judge concluded: 
The lack of justification "leads me to a deep, disturbing, and 
overriding concern that, without a proper and compelling 
justification, the Commonwealth may be successful in taking 
significant strides toward the establishment of a future po-
lice state, in which broad and vague concerns for adminis-
trative efffciency will serve to support substantial intrusions 
into the privacy of citizens." ld. 
The British experience, which commenced earlier than 
that of the United States, may be instructive. The British ini-
tially focused on sex offenses but later included burglaries 
and car theft because of the high number of matches. They 
found a cross-over between offenses. According to one offi-
cial, "People who commit serious crime very often have 
convictions for petty crime in their history." Wade, FB.I. Set 
to Open Its DNA Database for Fighting Crime, N.Y. Times, 
Oct. 12, 1998 (quoting David Ward, manager of the DNA 
database for England and Wales). While the cross-over 
concept is significant, the scope of the British system is 
breathtaking; they expect to "eventually include a third of all 
English men between 16 and 30, the principal ages for 
committing crimes." 
The category of crimes subject to databanking should be 
supported by empirical data or persuasive reasons. There 
is apparently some support for including property crimes. 
Property crimes, however, should be further defined. For 
example, historically, burglary was not considered a "prop-
erty" crime; it was a crime against habitation, intended to 
protect people in their dwellings. Burglars must anticipate 
what action they will take if surprised by an occupant, in-
cluding the use of force. Therefore, an argument to include 
burglary could be made, but felony tax evasion would be a 
different issue. 
Expansion of Coverage to Arrestees 
The Louisiana statute applies to sex offender arrestees. 
Moreover, New York Police Commissioner Howard Safir has 
proposed that DNA be collected from every arrestee. 
Hansen, Banking on DNA, 85 A.B.A. J. 26, 27 (Aug. 1999). 
Not satisfied with that proposal, New York Mayor Rudy 
Giuliani suggested that all newborns should be tested. 
Higgins, Acid Test, 85 A.B.A. J. 64, 65 (Oct. 1999). In con-
trast, a concurring opinion in State v. Olivas, 856 P.2d 1076, 
1094 (Wash. 1993), notes: "We would be appalled, I hope, 
if the State mandated non-consensual blood tests of the 
public at large for purposes of developing a comprehensive 
Washington DNA databank." 
